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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to
examine some earlier efforts to measure
the inequality of distribution within
several different substantive contexts
and to see how appropriate these
different measures might be if they
were applied to the distribution of
"power potential" in the international
system or any of its subsystems. We
discuss several measures which we find
would not be appropriate. We then
present a measure which we find better
suited for the purpose and go on to
compare it to earlier measures of
inequality. Several of these turn out
to be very similar to the one we present,
even though they were originally devised
for quite different purposes, such as
measuring the degree of economic
differentiation in a society. We con-
clude with a demonstration of the
essential similarities among most
of the measures discussed.
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While notions of equality and distributive justice are dear tohile of d distribw th hearts of most social scientists, the hard fact of life is
that almost nothing is equally distributed. Whether the valued
object is something as tangible as income, land, or votes, or so
elusive a thing as status or influence, some individuals usually
have more than others. The same holds for groups, be they
social classes, labor unions, political parties or nations; in any
social system, the chances are slim that each will possess the
same fraction or share of valued objects. Nor is the problem .
restricted to the distribution of &dquo;goods.&dquo; Such neutral distribu-
tions as age or hair color may be of concern, as might the
distribution of such &dquo;bads&dquo; as the tax burden or the incidence
of crime. This ubiquitous phenomenon is, furthermore, not
merely a matter of idle curiosity or a simple question of social
description. To the contrary, many theoretical arguments rest
heavily on the predictive or explanatory power of a given set of
distributions. From the primary group up through the inter-
national system, theoretical enlightenment often flows from an
understanding of the pattern in which certain values or ’.
attributes are distributed among the component units.
Measuring such inequality in these varying contexts may
seem, at first blush, to be a simple and straightforward matter.
In a system having two component units, for example, we need
merely measure the arithmetic difference or the ratio of their
percentage shares in order to get an intuitively reasonable
measure of the equality of a given distribution. A more difficult
problem arises, however, when we try to quantify the inequality
among more than two units. Even if the system at hand
contains only three units, there are no longer such obvious ways
to measure the inequality of a given distribution. Among three
groups, for example, which of the following distribution
patterns is most unequal: 70%, 20%, 10%; 70%, 30%, 0%; 70%,
15%, 15%? The answer is far from clear.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some earlier efforts
to measure the inequality of distribution within several dif-
ferent substantive contexts, and to see how appropriate these
different measures might be if they were applied to the
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distribution of &dquo;power potential&dquo; in the international system or
any of its subsystems. In the course of our discussion, we will
describe the fascinating, if sometimes laborious journey we have
taken through a maze of indices reflecting an impressive variety
of related-but not identical-concepts. Our hope will be to
share with the reader some of that fascination, while saving him
most of the labor involved in tracking these various indices back
to their disparate origins. We shall conclude by describing an
index we have found to be especially helpful if one is dealing
with a system containing a relatively small, but variable number
of units or categories.
There have been several illuminating discussions of measures
of inequality in the last decade, among which the one by Alker
and Russett (1964) is perhaps most familiar to political
scientists. Others of importance are Alker (1965), Hall and
Tideman (1967), Nutter (1968), Horvath (1970), Silberman
(1967), and Singer .( 1968). But rather than summarize all of
them here, we will introduce them in context as they become
relevant to the issues at hand. We begin by delineating briefly
some of the more important characteristics we expect to find in
a useful measure of inequality or concentration.
We should admit, and indeed will even emphasize, that the
criteria for selection of an index will vary as research purposes
change. Generally speaking, however, we suggest that an index
should have a range of zero to one; while not an essential
requirement, such a range is readily accomplished in most cases,
and it makes the measure easier to interpret, and index scores
easier to compare. Second, its magnitude should increase if
there is an upward redistribution of shares from any lower-
ranked unit to any higher-ranked unit, and vice versa. Third, it
should reflect the shares of all the units in the system and not
be largely or entirely determined by the shares of only a few of
the component members. Finally, it is critical that the measure
react to changes in system size in a manner which is appropriate
to one’s theoretical concerns. Such &dquo;appropriateness&dquo; is a major
preoccupation in this paper, and we focus first on that
particular problem.
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SENSITIVITY TO SYSTEM SIZE
Most of the indices we will discuss here satisfy the first three
criteria mentioned above. However, several of them are inade-
quate (for our purposes) in their response to changes in system
size, especially when N (referring to the number of component
units, groups, or categories, regardless of how many subgroups
or individuals are in each) is small. Some existing indices tend to
increase in value when N increases, others decrease, and some
are relatively insensitive to the size of the system, or,
alternatively, to the number of categories used. Which of these
relationships between an index of inequality and system size or
category number is desirable? It turns out that there is no single
answer to that question; rather, it depends very much on one’s
substantive concern. Consider the following examples.
If nation A possesses 90% of the military aircraft within a
three-nation subsystem, and the rest of the aircraft are
distributed evenly between the other two, the inequality in the
subsystem is certainly high. But if two or more nations entered .
the subsystem, and nation A managed to increase production or
imports enough to maintain its share at 90%, one might say the
inequality within the subsystem is higher. That is, 90% of the
hardware was originally &dquo;concentrated&dquo; in the hands of
33-1/3% of the actors (i.e., nation A), while, later on, that 90%
is concentrated in the hands of a mere 20% of the units. The
percentage controlled by A has remained the same, as has the
percentage controlled by the rest of the subsystem members.
Despite this basic similarity, from one point of view it seems
obvious that an increase in N has led to a greater inequality or
concentration within the subsystem. If one accepts this point of
view, then one would want an index of inequality that in creases
with N.
However, if one were interested in inequality of a different
kind-e.g., industrial concentration-there are good reasons for
wanting a different kind of index, even if one is dealing with
exactly the same distributions. If an industry was formerly
concentrated entirely in the hands of three firms, and two firms
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are added, the concentration of this industry has decreased,
even if the largest firm manages to maintain its 90% share of the
market, because the entire economic pie is now divided among
five rather than three firms. This situation would suggest the
need for an index that decreases when N increases.
Finally, there may be times when any kind of sensitivity to N
will be inappropriate. Lieberson (1969), discussing a concept
which is admittedly different from, but still related to,
inequality-i.e., &dquo;religious diversity&dquo;-suggests such a case.
Suppose we are comparing the diversity between two campus
fraternities. Both fraternities have ten Jews and twenty Cath-
olics, but the second fraternity also has one Protestant.
Lieberson points out that a measure which increased with N
(which in this case equals the number of categories) would give
a significantly higher score to the second fraternity. This
&dquo;radical difference&dquo; would be misleading, as would any signifi-
cant difference that resulted from an index’ sensitivity to the
number of categories, Lieberson maintains, because the groups
have nearly identical religious composition.
These examples make it clear that, depending on one’s
theoretical concerns and the particular concept at hand, one
may want an inequality index which rises with N, falls when N
rises, or which is not sensitive to changes in system size or
category number. In a recent paper of ours (Singer et al., 1972),
one of the predictor variables in the model was the changing
distribution of power potential among the major powers during
the 1816-1965 period.’ 1 During that epoch, the size of the
maj or power subset ranged between 5 and 8. In such a
longitudinal analysis, where one of the goals was to ascertain
the effect of changing concentration of power upon variations
in the incidence of major power war, the concentration measure
has to be comparable from one observation to the next, despite
fluctuations in size. That led us into a literature search in
pursuit of such a measure, and that pursuit-plus the difficulty
we had in finding such a measure-led to the paper at hand.
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EVALUATING SOME PREVIOUS MEASURES
While the idea of concentration or unequal distribution seems
unambiguous, attempts to make it operational, verbally or
mathematically, reflect a remarkably wide range of interpre-
tations. On the other hand, the diversity is not nearly as great as
the number of alternative indices might lead one to suspect.
Many of the indices of inequality (as well as indices of a variety
of related concepts) turn out, despite surface differences, to be
functionally equivalent. One set of measures is based on the
sum of squares, or EPi2 approach, and the other is based on
deviations from a line of perfect equality. And in the conclusion
we will show that even these two types of indices are
translatable into equivalent terms.
Sum of Squares Indices .
The first category contains measures known variously as
indices of concentration, fractionalization, diversity, or hetero-
geneity. Perhaps the best known of these is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of industrial concentration, which simply
equals the sum of the squares of each unit’s percentage share, or
Epi2 (Herfindahl, 1950). While this measure uses information
about all the units in the system, its magnitude is heavily
influenced by the scores of those with the largest shares of the
market. That is, the squares of small percentages are very small
indeed, and thus have a disproportionately modest impact on
the final index score.
To illustrate, if the shares of the market (or other valued
objects) are equally distributed in a five-unit system, HH =
(20%)2 + (20%)2 + (20%)2 + (20%)2 + (20%)2 = .20. If ten new
units are added to the system, and each controls .1 %, leaving
the original five with 19.8% each, that makes virtually no
impression on HH, reducing it slightly to .196. This decrease in
the index score occurs despite the fact that the addition of ten
almost totally deprived units to the system-and the resulting
predominant position of the original five units-has, at least
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from one point of view, substantially increased the inequality in
the system.
However, we should remember that HH is a measure of a
special kind of inequality (i.e., industrial concentration) and
one can certainly argue, as we already have, that the addition of
ten new firms is &dquo;deconcentrating&dquo; even if those firms only
capture a very small share of the market. This kind of reasoning
leads Hall and Tideman (1967) to argue that &dquo;a measure of
concentration should be a decreasing function of N.&dquo; The ten
new firms in this example are &dquo;underprivileged&dquo; to a marked 
B
degree, but they still have succeeded in breaking into a market
formerly dominated completely by five firms. The inequality
added by the ten new firms exerts an upward pressure on HH,
but that is more than offset by the increase in N-i.e., an
increase in the number of firms which have managed to capture
a share, no matter how small, of the market.
Such sensitivity to N may be appropriate when measuring
industrial concentration, but its appropriateness is at least
questionable when measuring the concentration of power
potential in an international system. Consider these two simple
systems:
The HH index suggests that there is more inequality in systems I
than in system II. In some contexts, that judgment would be
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acceptable, but it should be noted that, in the first system, 90%
of the power potential is in the hands of the upper third of the
states, whereas in the second, 90% of the power potential is
controlled by an even smaller minority-i.e., the upper fifth of
the states.
The results in both examples are, of course, affected by the
fact that HH does not have a range of zero to one. The lower
limit of HH is 1 IN, which means that HH can approach zero
only as N approaches infinity. When N is as small as three, or
even ten, the lower limits of HH are .33 and .10, respectively. In
the example immediately above, HH &dquo;starts out&dquo; from a higher
level in system I than in II, and the final index score is higher in
that case, even though (to repeat) 90% of the power potential in
II is concentrated in a smaller proportion of its component
units.
A perusal of the literature reveals that there are several
measures which are similar, or algebraically identical, to HH,
even though some of them are not designed to measure
industrial concentration, or even inequality per se. The discus- .
sion which follows should make obvious the similarity of such
concepts as inequality, concentration, fractionalization, eth-
nicity, diversity, and heterogeneity. Greenberg (1956), for
example, presents a measure of linguistic diversity, which is
basically the sum of the probabilities that two individuals
randomly chosen from a population will belong to the same
linguistic group.’ If one group makes up 50% of the society,
then the probability that any two individuals chosen from the
total population will be chosen from that particular group is .50
x .50, or .25. If .25 is added to the probability of randomly
choosing two individuals from each of the remaining groups
(whose number and size are of consequence only when their
probability value is being computed), the result is Greenberg’s
index.
But this index turns out to be identical to YPj 2 , where Pi in
this case is the percentage share of the total population held by
the ith group, rather than the percentage share of the market
controlled by the ith firm. The linguistic diversity index is
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functionally and arithmetically equal to the Herfmdahl-Hirsch-
man index of industrial concentration.
Similar to both these measures is the Rae and Taylor (1970)
index of fragmentation. Their formula is
1 .
1 - N(N - 1) ~fi(fi - 1),
where fi equals the number in the ith subgroup and N equals the
number in the total group. A slight rearrangement of termS3
reveals that this formula is equivalent to
(fi) (fi - 1)
1 (N) (N - 1 ) . °
It then becomes obvious that fi/N is a term representing the
proportion of the whole made up by the ith subgroup, and that
(fi - 1 )/(N - 1) is only a very slight modification of that term.
In short, this measure is equivalent to-or, more precisely, the
complement of-~Pi 2.
However, we should point out that, if one is measuring
fragmentation of a comparatively small body, such as a
committee or legislature, the second term in Rae and Taylor’s
equation will not be identical to the first term, and the index
will deviate perceptibly from the simple ~Pi 2. To illustrate, if
there were 100 representatives in a legislative body, the
contribution of a group of 25 to the fragmentation index score
would be 25/100 x 24/99, or .0606, whereas if I;Pi 2 were the
index, that group’s contribution to the score would be .0625.
Such differences, when summed over several groups, can lead to
a noticeable difference between the Rae and Taylor index and
Epi 2
Furthermore, the small difference will make conceptual
sense. If we reason that the measure should reflect the sum of
probabilities that two individuals randomly chosen from the
legislative body will belong to the same party, then the
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smallness of the body makes it strictly incorrect to calculate
those probabilities by simply squaring fi/N. Replacement of
individuals drawn from a population, and/or an infinitely large
population should not be assumed; therefore fi/N should be
multiplied by (fi - 1 )/(N - 1) in order to obtain those
probabilities. 
2
Yet another index which is based on the EP;2 is the Michaely
(1962) concentration index, which does not measure industrial
concentration, but &dquo;tendencies toward geographic concentra-
tion in transactions&dquo; (Puchala, 1970). It shows the extent to
which an actor’s transactions are widely distributed throughout
the system (low score), focused on a small cluster of partners
(high score), or shared with a single artner only (highest score).
The index formula is 100 E(Xsj/X.j) , where Xsj equals j’s
transactions with s, and X.j equals the total transactions for j;
Xsj/X.j is a proportion, of course, and since it is squared, the
similarity of this measure to EPi2 is obvious. Taking the square
root of the summed squares changes the range within which the
index is most sensitive. We used this same technique in
constructing the measure to be described below.
This list of measures based on lPi 2 can be continued almost
indefinitely. Another important one is Lieberson’s ( 1969) index
of population diversity, as are several which he discusses: the
Bachi (1956) and Simpson (1949) indices of diversity,. the Bell
(1954) index of ecological segregation, and the Gibbs and
Martin ( 1962) measure of diversification in an industry.
Finally we would like to mention a measure of industrial
concentration which &dquo;owes its intellectual parentage to the
Herfindahl Summary Index&dquo; (Horvath, 1970), but which is
sufficiently different to be worth considering if the LPi 2 is not
deemed satisfactory. Horvath’s measure,
n
CCI = xi + L (x/(1 + [I - xj] ),
j=2
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where I = 1, j = 2, 3, 4, ... , n, and n = the number of firms in
the industry, and x = the decimal fraction of assets (or sales,
employment, or profit) belonging to each individual firm. A
detailed discussion of this measure would be out of place here,
since for our purposes this measure shares the disadvantages of
its intellectual parent, LPi 2. Suffice it to say that this measure
focuses upon-and therefore reflects-both absolute concentra-
tion (having to do with the smallness of the number of firms in
the industry) and relative concentration (having to do with
comparisons of the sizes of the firms in the industry, regardless
of the number of firms which exist).’
Deviation from Equality Indices
Our second category contains perhaps the best known
measures of inequality in economics and political science-the
Gini index’ and the Schutz coefficient. Both are based upon
the deviation of a Lorenz curve from the &dquo;line of perfect
equality.&dquo; The rationale behind these measures is indeed
intuitively appealing. If one constructs a graph (see Figure 1 a)
indicating what percentage of a good is held by each percentage
of a population, and if each 1 % of the population possesses 1 %
of the good, the Lorenz curve will fall completely on the line of
perfect equality, whose slope equals one. However, if the goods
are not distributed evenly, the Lorenz curve will deviate from
the line of perfect equality, as in examples in Figure 1 b and 1 c.
The Gini index and the Schutz coefficient measure these
deviations in slightly different ways. According to Alker (1965),
&dquo;the Gini index sums for each individual in the population, the
difference between where he is on the Lorenz curve and where
he would be expected to be in the case of democratic equality.&dquo;
The Schutz coefficient, on the other hand, sums &dquo;ratios of
advantage&dquo; for each population percentile above or below the
equal share point. It is based on the slope of the Lorenz curve,
and in effect reflects how close the slope of the line below the
equal share point is to zero, or how close the slope of the line
above the equal share point is to infinity.
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Figure 1a: LORENZ CURVE INDICATING PERFECT EQUALITY OF
_ 
DISTRIBUTION
The Gini index appears to meet most of the basic require-
ments of a good measure of inequality. It utilizes the
information available about all units, increases in response to
exchanges of shares from lower- to higher-ranked units, and vice
versa. However, if one is measuring the concentration of power
potential in a rather small international subsystem, the Gini
index has some properties which might not be desirable. Some
of these are related to the fact that it has an upper limit of 1 -
1 IN, because it was originally designed for continuous, rather
than discrete, distributions. Figure 2-in which A holds all and
B holds none-illustrates this problem. Even though the
inequality of this situation is complete, only half of the &dquo;area of
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Figure 1b: LORENZ CURVE INDICATING ’SOME’ INEQUALITY IN THE
DISTRIBUTION
Figure 1c: LORENZ CURVE INDICATING ’GREATER’ INEQUALITY IN THE
DISTRIBUTION
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Figure 2: LORENZ CURVE WITH ONE UNIT POSSESS1NG ALL, AND THE
OTHER UNIT NONE
inequality&dquo; (the triangle below and to the right of the line of
perfect equality) lies between the line of perfect equality and
the Lorenz curve. Therefore, the Gini index-reflecting the
percentage of the total area of inequality falling between the
Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality-equals .50, the
upper limit in the two-unit case. In the three-unit case, of
course, the upper limit would be .67.
This fluctuation in the upper limit of the Gini index, much
like that of the lower limit of HH, can have an undesirable
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effect on index scores. Consider, for example, an attempt to
measure the concentration of power potential at two points in
time in a small international subsystem.
If the Gini index-calculated according to Alker’s (1965)
formula for approximations in case of discrete distributions-is
used as one’s measure of concentration of power potential, the .
subsystem appears to be marked by greater concentration at the
second point in time.
In fact, however, the Gini index is slightly higher in the
second case, not because the subsystem more nearly approaches
the condition of perfect concentration (with one state so
&dquo;unequal&dquo; as to control 100~0 of the power potential) in the
latter case, but because the upper limit of the index has been
increased by the addition of two states to the subsystem at that
point in time. Although Gini has probably not been used in
exactly this way, it would not be obviously unreasonable to
make such a use of it. Our point here is that if it is used for this
(or similar) purposes, it will be very sensitive to differences in
system size when N is small, and the user should be sure that
this sensitivity is appropriate for his purposes.
Gini Versus HH
As we have seen above, Gini has an upper limit of 1 - 1 /N,
while HH (and the various similar measures) has a lower limit of
1 IN. There is at least one other striking difference which should
be mentioned here. Hall and Tideman claim that if &dquo;a [system] ]
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A has k times the number f units as [system] B, with k > 1,
and the Pi’s [percentage shares] in A are distributed such that
cprresponding to each Pi in B there are k units of size Pdk, then
the measure of concentration for A should be 1 /k times the
measure for B.&dquo; The explanation is that &dquo;if each [unit] in a
given [system] is divided into two [units] of equal size, the
effect on a measure of concentration should be to reduce it by
1/2.&dquo;
Although we agree that such a property may be desirable if
industrial concentration is being measured, we are less certain
that it is appropriate when measuring concentration of power
potential, or other kinds of inequality. In any case, HH and the
Gini index react very differently to situations such as that
described above by Hall and Tideman. For example, consider
the following two subsystems.
It is readily seen that HH for system II equals 1/2 the HH
score for system I, which, according to Hall and Tideman, is
expected and desirable. But the Gini index remains unchanged,
since in both system I and system II the upper 25% of the units
control 40% of the goods, the next 25% control 30% of the
goods, and so on. The &dquo;blindness&dquo; of the Gini index to the
differences in these two cases is again attributable to the fact
that it was not designed for discrete distributions. This
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difference between these indices cannot be resolved by &dquo;con-
trolling for&dquo; N. If N is controlled for, HH = .20 in both cases,
while Gini = .33 in the first case, and .29 in the second.
Another Gini &dquo;Blind Spot&dquo;
Kravis (1962) has pointed out that the Gini index assumes
that &dquo;equal importance may be attached to equal absolute
differences in income ... even though one of the differences is
taken between two low [value positions] and the other between
two high ones.&dquo; This means that very different distributions can
and will generate Lorenz curves which deviate to the same
extent from the line of perfect equality. The following very
disparate distribution patterns, for example, both have a Gini
value of .50.
If one is particularly interested in an inequality which tends
toward monopoly (one unit controls 100%), then one would
probably want system I to receive a higher score. On the other
hand, if one’s interest is in the extent to which the smaller units
in a system are deprived, system II should receive a higher score.
(Of course, no single measure can satisfy all theoretical needs,
since one which would rank both of these cases &dquo;higher&dquo; is
obviously not feasible.)’
The Schutz Coefficient
Shifting now to the Schutz coefficient, we find that it is
similar to the Gini index in that its upper limit is also 1 - 1 IN.
However, the reason for this may not be so intuitively clear.
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The Schutz coefficient sums &dquo;ratios of advantage,&dquo; and these
ratios are comparisons of the holdings of the advantaged (or the
disadvantaged) to the average percentage of holdings of all the









where v = the average share of the units in the system; vi = the
share of the ith unit; and AX~ = X;+ 1 - Xi, when Xi = i/N.)
These average holdings become smaller with every increase in N.
Again, in the extreme case, if the system has only two units, the .
average holding is 50% no matter how unequally the holdings
may be distributed, and when N increases to 4, 5, or 10, the
average holding decreases to 25%, 20%, and 10%, respectively.
The larger N is, the larger is the ratio of advantage of the one
unit which controls 100% of the goods, and the larger is the
upper limit of the Schutz coefficient.
Perhaps the most unattractive characteristic of this measure is
that it does not make use of all available information. Alker
(1965) points out that Schutz can be calculated either by
summing the ratios of advantage for those above the mean or by
summing the ratios of disadvantage for those below the mean.
Of course, this means that the coefficient cannot be sensitive to
variations within that part of the distribution which is not
included in the calculations. Furthermore, because the coeffi-
cient sums the ratios of advantage, and since different combina-
tions of ratios can give the same sum, the coefficient can also be
insensitive to variations in the distribution in the group which is
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included in the calculations. For example, the Schutz coeffi-
cient equals .50 in all three of the cases below.
Before turning to our own proposed index, we should
mention briefly several other measures of inequality, some of
which may be excellent for certain purposes. One widely used
measure of industrial concentration, CR, equals the fraction of
the market held by the L largest firms, where L usually equals
4, 8, or 20. Another measure of industrial concentration,
introduced by Hall and Tideman, is TH, defmed as 1/(2EiPi) -
1, where i equals the rank of the ith largest unit, and Pi equals
the percentage share of that unit. Several other measures are
discussed by Alker and Russett (1964), including the ratio of
the percentage controlled by the largest unit to the percentage
controlled by the smallest unit, the Pareto coefficient, and the
skewness of a distribution. Though it is possible that one of the
measures might be ideal for some specialized purpose, we agree
with Alker and Russett that in most cases they are not as
generally applicable as the other measures discussed above.
THE PROPOSED INDEX OF CONCENTRATION
Before describing the index which we decided to use for our
own purposes, let us restate briefly the criteria we hope to
satisfy. First, we want our measure to have a range of zero to
one, even at the lower end of the size spectrum, because we
seek to measure concentration in both the full international
system, with an N as large as 135, and in its smaller regional and
functional subsystems-with Ns as low as 5. Also its magnitude
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should increase if there is an upward redistribution of shares
from any lower-ranked to any higher-ranked unit, and vice
versa. Furthermore, it should reflect the shares of every unit in
the system, and not merely of those which fall, for example,
above or below the mean. Finally, it is critical that the measure
react to changes in system size in a manner which is appropriate
to our theoretical concern.
With the few exceptions that we have mentioned explicitly
above, most measures satisfy the first three criteria, but meeting
the fourth criterion proves to be more problematical. As we
have implied in the discussion above, because the measures we
looked at had different ranges for different Ns, they appeared
to us to be overly sensitive to changes in N. This led us to prefer
a standardized measure which has the same range regardless of
system size. The basic formula for our index of concentration
(or CON) is: standard deviation of the percentage shares -
maximum possible standard deviation in a system of size N.
Fortunately, this simplifies to
. 
EP /NEP? - IIN
CON = 1 - IIN
The maximum possible standard deviation of the percentage
shares occurs when one unit controls 100% of the goods, while
the rest of the units control none at all. And the minimum
(zero) occurs when all the units control equal shares. Thus CON
is equal to 1 whenever a single unit controls 100% of the goods,
regardless of system size. It also has the virtue of taking into
account information regarding all units, and it increases in value
if there is a shift in shares from a lower-ranked to a
higher-ranked unit, and vice versa.’ 7
Now the fact that we opted for a standardized measure does
not mean that we wanted or have a measure that is totally
insensitive to system size. While the range of this measure is
constant, and therefore insensitive, the scores on the index will
rise and fall with system size, even when nothing else changes.
For example, consider this subsystem at two points in time:
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The only difference is that two units have been added at t 1; no
shares have been shifted from some units to others. Yet CON is
higher (because of the change in the standardizing denomi-
nator), as we believe it should be, since more power potential is
concentrated in the hands of a smaller percentage of the
subsystem’s members. Had we wanted a measure that was
insensitive to N (when nothing else changes), we could have
used an unstandardized measure such as HH. In the case at
hand, HH would equal .82 on both occasions; the range of HH
is sensitive to changes in N in such cases, but the scores are not.
The advantage, we believe, of a standardized measure such as
CON is that scores are comparable, in the sense that a score of
.33, for example, indicates that the system shows one-third as
much concentration as is possible, no matter what the size of
the system. Unstandardized measures such as HH or Gini will
reflect changes in N only because their ranges will change (and
therefore may appear to be too sensitive to such changes) but
not necessarily because the degree of concentration has
changed. And in examples like the one above, the scores may
not change when N changes, but those scores will not be
comparable.
Now the price of this comparability as we have defined it is
an insensitivity to changes in N at the extremes of the index.
For example, if there are 5 units in a system and 1 unit controls
100%, CON = 1. If 7 units are added to the system, but 1 unit
still controls 100%, CON still equals 1. This is so even though all
the goods are concentrated in the hands of 20% of the units in
the first case, but in the hands of an even smaller minority of
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12.5% of the units in the second case. Such changes in N (when
nothing else changes) will be reflected in CON as long as no one
unit controls 100%. If one is dealing with that rare empirical
domain in which such extreme cases occur, and one wants an
index that will be sensitive to changes in N, then CON should
not be used. In our case, these extreme distributions are not
possible, and it seemed worthwhile to forego sensitivity to N in
such cases for the sake of comparability across the much more
common cases where there is some, but not absolute, inequality.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the characteristics of the
CON measure is to show how it varies vis-d-vis several alternative
indices in a few simple examples. Assume that we are measuring
the concentration of power potential among states in two
different international subsystems containing three and five
states, respectively.
While HH and CON produce the intuitively reasonable higher
index score for case I, the Gini scores are just the opposite,
albeit not by much. This latter result is largely a function of N,
since the upper limit of the Gini index is only .67 in case I, but
.80 in case II. If we correct Gini for N (by dividing it by I -
I/N), it rises to .85 in I and only to .74 in II, making it more
consonant with the HH and CON results. However, when Gini is
corrected in this fashion, it has less discriminating power in this
I example (i.e., the sensitivity of the index as reflected in the
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difference between the scores in the two cases is diminished), a
characteristic which also showed up when we used this modified
Gini on our own historical data. One can enhance the
discriminating power of some indices by taking the square root
of the raw scores. But when we used that technique on our data 
’
with the Gini index, its discriminating power decreased, as it
does in this example above (that is, the square root values of the
Gini corrected for N are .92 and .86).
As we noted, the HH and CON scores seem to be in the
&dquo;correct&dquo; order, but the HH pattern is largely a function of its
lower limits, which are .33 and .20, respectively. And while
such sensitivity to N happens to produce the appropriate scores
in the cases at hand, it often will not. Consider the following
pair of subsystems.
HH indicates that the concentration of power potential in I is
slightly higher, even though its equality of distribution is
perfect. CON, on the other hand, reacts more appropriately in
this empirical and theoretical context, since its upper and lower
limits do not vary with the size of the system.
Let us consider one more example.
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While the HH results are appropriate according to the Hall and
Tideman criterion, with its value. in case I twice that produced
for case II, the Gini index scores are identical. For our purposes,
the face validity of both of these results leaves something to be
desired. Conversely, the CON scores of .26 and .17 seem to us
to reflect most appropriately the differences in the inequality of
the distribution of power potential in the two systems. In any
case, these illustrations demonstrate that-at least when one is
measuring concentration or inequality among a rather small, but
changing number of units-there are differences among such
measures as HH, the Gini index, the Schutz coefficient, and
CON which should be taken into account by any potential user.
SIMILARITY TO OTHER MEASURES
Over 15 years ago, in the conclusion of an article analyzing
indices of segregation, Duncan and Duncan (1955) lamented
that
one lesson to be learned from the relatively unproductive experience
with segregation indexes to date is that similar problems are often
dealt with under different headings. Most of the issues which have
[427]
come up in the literature on segregation indexes.... had already
been encountered in the methodological work on measures of
inequality, spatial distribution, and localization in geography and
economics.
We have learned a similar lesson from our experience with
indexes of inequality. The major problem we have discussed
here-i.e., comparability in the face of a small but changing
N-has been dealt with under different headings and solved in
essentially the same manner. For example, Amemiya ( 1963) has
developed an index of economic differentiation (IED) which
equals
n 
n n Pi - 1 2 . -I n ’ ,
I= I
where n = the number of classifications of industry, and Pi is
defined as the proportion of workers in the ith industry. If we
say that n = N = the number of units in the system, and that Pi
is the percentage controlled by the ith unit, we can see that IED
is essentially the same as CON. That is,
N . 
z
IED = N/N - 1 (Pi - 1 /N)2 = N/N - 1 E(Pi - 1 /N)2
i= 1
= N/N - 1 E(Pi - 2Pi/N + 1/N2) = N/N - 1 EPi 
’
- 2/NEPi + N[1/N] 2 = N/N - lEP2 - 2/N[1] + 1/N
2 _ EP2 - 1/N EP2 - I/N
. = N/N - 1 kP. - 1 l/N = N - l/N = 1 - l/N
Thus, CON is equivalent to the square root of IED.
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Similarly, Labovitz and Gibbs (1964) present a measure of





where N equals the number of occupations, and X is the
number of individuals in each occupational category. This is
also essentially equal to CON. The term E X2 / [ E X] 2 = ~p.2,
which means that D = 1 - E Pi / 1 - IN. Therefore, 
1
1 - EPi1 - 1/N - CON.
In short, 1 - D = CON. It can further be shown that the index
of qualitative variation (IQV), presented by Mueller et al.
(1970), which equals
. Zninj .11




(where ni = the number in the ith category, i ~ j, and k = the
number of categories) is related to CON in the same way. That
is, ýl - IQV = CON.
Aside from the fact that we use the index as a measure of
concentration, rather than of economic differentiation, division
of labor, qualitative diversity, and so on, the only substantial
difference between CON and these other measures is that we
use the square root of the same basic formula. We do this for
several reasons. First, this procedure increases the discrimina-
tion of CON within the range of inequality in the small N
systems that are of concern to us here. Second, we find the
conceptual definition of CON as the standard deviation of the
percentage shares divided by the maximum possible standard
deviation in a system of size N an intuitively appealing one; this
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means that by definition, we should use the square root.
Finally, one critic has already pointed out that, despite the fact
that we criticize HH on the grounds that the squares of small
percentages are very small, and that therefore they have a
disproportionately small impact on the final index score, we
turn around and use the squares of small percentages in our own
index. But, by using the square root of the difference between
these small squared percentages and 1 /N, and even more
importantly, by standardizing the measure the way we do, CON
avoids this insensitivity to small percentages that HH displays,
even though the squares of small percentages are used in both
indices.
CONVERGENCE OF MEASURES
In examining the important differences among the available
measures of concentration, we noted that they nevertheless fall
into two basic classes. While retaining the distinction (sum of
squares versus deviation from equality) for the sake of clarity,
we now follow up the earlier suggestion that even this
distinction is far from fundamental.
The mathematical convergence among these diverse measures
begins to become evident .when we note that all of them can be
expressed in the same basic terms: Pi, i, and N, where Pi equals
the percentage share of the ith unit, i equals the rank of the ith
largest unit, and N equals the number of units in the system.
This equivalence is further reflected by the fact that-with the
exception of the Schutz coefficient-all the major measures are
a function of either: (a) the sum of squared percentage shares,
or (b) the sum of rank share products.
The most obvious similarity, already discussed above, is that
between CON and HH, both of which are originally expressed in
terms of Pi and N. If
. 
. EPi - 1 /N
~~~ I _ I:: ,CON = 1 _ 1 /N ’
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and HH = 2;Pi , we can also express CON as
HH - I/NB 1-1/N ’ °
Hence, it is clear that CON2 -and therefore CON itself-is a
perfectly predictable function of HH, as long as we know the
value of N. What is true of the relationship between CON and
HH is also true, of course, of the relationship between CON and
all those other measures discussed which are based on the sum
of squared percentage shares, or some slight mutation thereof.
The Gini index can also be expressed in terms of Pi, i, and N,
as may be seen by referring to Figure 3. What the Gini formula
does, in effect, is to sum the area of the rectangles in the figure,
and subtract that sum from one, the total &dquo;area of inequality&dquo;
that lies above and below the line of perfect equality. The
resulting difference is the proportion of the total area that lies
between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality; that
proportion is the Gini index score. By referring to Figure 3, one
can see that there are 2i - 1 rectangles associated with each
group. For example, group A, which is the fourth largest group,
has (2 x 4) - 1, or 7 rectangles associated with it. The area of
each of the rectangles in the figure equals the product of 1 IN
(i.e., the proportion of the whole which each group constitutes,
which is represented by the length of each rectangle as
measured along the horizontal axis), and Pi (the proportion of
the whole which each group controls, which is represented by
the width of each rectangle as measured along the vertical axis),
or Pi/N. Therefore, the area of the rectangles associated with
group A is .25 x .10, or .10/4, which equals .025. There are 7
such rectangles, so group A’s contribution is 7 x .025, or .1750.
The contribution of all the other groups can be calculated in the
same way. The Gini index is thus equal to I - 2(2i &horbar; 1
[P~/N]). But this can be simplified to
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Figure 3: LORENZ CURVES ENCOMPASSING PROPORTION OF TOTAL AREA
EQUAL TO THE GINI INDEX
Z(2i - 1)(Pi)
1- N = 1 - I /Nz(2i - 1)(Pi)
= 1 - 1/NE(2iPi - Pi) = 1 - I/NZ2iPi-l/NlPi.
Since 1;Pi = 1, and the constant 2 can be brought outside the
summation sign, this further simplifies to 1 - (2/NEiPi) - 1/N.
Thus, it can be seen that the Gini index is a function of the rank
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share products, or lipi, as is TH, which, as we recall, equals
l/(22iP~)-l.
Turning to the Schutz coefficient, we find that it, too, can be
expressed in terms of Pi and N. Recall that the original formula
is
L: (v/« - I)l1X¡.
>-
. Vi=V
However, vi is equivalent to Pi, and both v and AXi = 1 /N. (As
long as each unit represents an equal percentage of the total
number of units.) Thus for formula can be rewritten as:
. P; 1
. X ~ 1/N- 1 N’ .
P.~l/N
and this in turn simplifies to .
. ~ (Pi - 1 /N).
Pi=l/N






The measurement of inequality and related concepts is a
pervasive problem in several social sciences. We have discussed
various attempts to solve this problem and have found that the
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measures often differ in their reaction to changes in system size.
In that discussion, we pointed out that some measures might
not be appropriate if one were measuring the concentration of
power potential in the international system or its subsystems.
We have presented a measure that seems appropriate for such a
purpose, and then examined its similarity to other measures
which have been used for quite different purposes. Finally, we
concluded, by focusing on the essential similarity of most of the
measures we discussed, that they are all a function of Pi, N,
and/or i, where Pi equals the percentage share of the ith unit, N
equals the number of units in the system, and i equals the rank
of the ith largest unit.
In closing, it might be appropriate to suggest that the
establishment of a journal such as this was long overdue. In the
literature of 5 disciplines, at least 25 scholars have utilized over
15 different journals to present their efforts to get at a central
problem in the social sciences. Our fairly thorough search in the
more likely sectors, as well as conversations with other political
scientists, however, turned up only about half these efforts;
until our first draft was circulated to specialists in sociology, the
remaining sources remained beyond our ken. Even now, we
suspect that economists and psychologists, for example, might
lead us to additional papers on the same class of problem. Had
this journal been available as a prominent solution, these
independent &dquo;discoveries&dquo; and the attendant costly digressions
might have been avoided.
Be that as it may, we trust that this effort represents a
modest accretion to our methodological armamentarium. In
addition to offering a small improvement on some existing
indicators of concentration, it should help to put the problem
into fuller context, offering as it does a synthesis and a
codification of those which have gone before. At the least, its
circulation among political scientists should serve as a reminder




1. The power-or more accurately, power potential-index reflects three sets of
dimensions, each of which taps two phenomena; military (personnel and expendi-
tures); industrial (energy consumption and iron/steel production); and demographic
(total population and urban population). The 1816-1965 data base, plus the derived
measures and their rationale, will appear in Singer and Small (forthcoming).
2. Greenberg also presents a more complex measure which is modified to reflect
the dissimilarity of the languages involved.
3. Charles Taylor (1970) uses this formula to measure party concentration in
legislatures.
4. A good discussion of the measure can be found in Horvath’s article. For those
who want to compare "within subset" concentration to "between subset" concen-
tration, see Hexter and Snow (1970). And for a discussion of the special problem of
inferring the concentration of an industry from the observation of a few firms, see
Silberman (1967), and Hart and Prais (1956).
5. Several indices similar to the Gini index have been used to measure
"segregation." For example, see the "nonwhite section index" and the "nonwhite
ghetto index" (Jahn et aL, 1947), the Cowgills’ (1951) index of segregation, and the
"reproducibility index" (Jahn, 1950). For a discussion of all these measures and their
similarity to the Gini index and to each other, see Duncan and Duncan (1955), and
Homseth (1947).
6. It should be noted also that this example does not involve a change in the
number of units (since we could have given the lowest two units in the second case a
percentage only slightly larger than zero to meet the objection that system II "really"
only contains three units); this is another case in which Gini cannot be made more
"reasonable" simply by correcting it with a denominator of 1 - 1/N.
7. It was interesting to discover while preparing this paper that Janda (1971) has
come up with exactly the same formula to cope with the problem of measuring
"party articulation."
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